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INTRODUCTION

This paper examines the challenges that confront the international community in
seeking to harmonize fundamentally different world views. It explores antimonies
that arise when freedom of expression and freedom of religion collide. A number
of relevant controversies are noted. These include those surrounding: Salman
Rushdie’s book The Satanic Verses; the Danish cartoons; the Dutch film
Submission Part I; and the banning of head scarves in public institutions in some
European States5 but not others.6 An expansive literature on these topics has
already emerged.7 Simultaneously, a number of ‘atheist manifestos’ have been
published. Many of these books directly criticize world religions.8 Some single
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out religion as the primary cause of sectarian hatred and violence.9 Somewhat
surprisingly, many recent books of this kind have not triggered the level of protest
that has followed earlier criticisms of monotheistic faiths. Nonetheless they feed
into the growing debate over the role of religion in contemporary societies,10 and
whether freedom of expression must be exercised with sensitivity and respect for
the religious beliefs of others. The core question to be explored here is:
Does freedom of speech include the right to publicly ridicule the religious
beliefs of others?
This question is addressed by reference to the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (1966) (hereinafter ‘the Covenant’), General Comments of
the Human Rights Committee, jurisprudence of international and domestic
courts, and the writings of legal commentators.
The paper concludes with observations about the phenomena of extremism and
religious violence. It highlights the role democracy and human rights can play in
building ideologies that encourage religious moderation, tolerance, human
security and protection of minority rights. These observations are made with the
knowledge that the Islamic world has always belonged to the human rights
movement. This is evident from the adoption by Muslim States of both the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) (1948) and the Covenant.
Significantly, no country has ever voted against the UDHR. Moreover, almost all
States (including the vast majority of Muslim States) have now ratified the
Covenant.11
B

GLOBALIZATION, RELIGIOUS SENSIBILITIES AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Human rights norms may be interpreted and applied in different ways at a local,
national and international level. Even at a local level, there can be profound
differences of opinion on the nature and scope of basic human rights. A group of
students from the same community may for example disagree on how human
rights are to be applied in a given context. For example, one student’s literary
masterpiece may be another’s blasphemy. How are such diametrically opposed
views to be harmonized? Is this an achievable goal? Or is it overly ambitious to
hope for universal agreement on the manner in which basic human rights may be
exercised? In this context it is acknowledged that some religious sects contain
inherent constraints on the exercise of Covenant rights and freedoms, including
9
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freedom of religion and expression.12 The mere raising of certain questions can
carries implications in some societies. In some States certain topics are not
open for public discussion. Advocacy of gay and lesbians rights, or criticism of
the behaviour of the Prophet Mohammed, are two examples. Public debate
about such matters is not acceptable in some Muslim countries. This article
explores some of the practical and normative difficulties posed by these issues in
an age of pluralism and democracy where competing rights must be balanced. A
range of questions are considered: Should the ‘protected knowledge’ of one faith
be forbidden territory for comedians, philosophers, and critics who hold a
different world view? Can a balance to be struck between (a) respect for religious
beliefs and (b) traditions of artistic license and freedom of expression? Or is
there an irreconcilable different of opinion on this issue? Is this a bona fide ‘clash
of civilizations’?13 Will an international consensus emerge on the need to curb
freedom of expression, so insults upon religious belief may be limited? Is
policing of critical expression compatible with democracy, pluralism, and human
rights?
C

DOES FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE INCLUDE THE RIGHT TO
CRITICIZE RELIGIONS?

Freedom to criticize religious ideas has long been a foundational principle in
western democratic societies.14 Two important justifications for this position are
noted here. Firstly, without this freedom, those who found religions for financial
gain (i.e. in order to exploit the religious vulnerability of others) would be legally
shielded from public criticism of their ‘religious’ practices. Secondly, belief
systems which advocate physical violence may also be legally protected.
Denunciation of dangerous religious sects has played an important role in human
security and development in many States, including Japan and the US. However
with this freedom comes the right to challenge orthodox religious ideas. This is
precisely what a number of the greatest ‘enlightenment scholars’ of 18 and 19th
century Europe did. A number attracted the ire of the establishment. Some paid
with their careers and even their lives. For enlightenment philosophers, reason,
science, and rational thought replaced the theological constraints that had often
held back their predecessors. Superstition and ignorance were challenged.15
Liberalism and secularism flourish. The separation of religion and State became
the norm. The burning of ‘witches’ ceased. The persecution of religious heretics
and apostates ended. Freedom of speech and religion became the cornerstones
of democratic polity. Scholars were free to critically analyze sacred texts of all
12
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faiths, and question long held assumptions about the universe.16 While this
intellectual renaissance did not prevent war, it did sparked innovation in 18th and
19th century European States, and contributed to developments in a range of
fields including: political science, economics, philosophy and the natural
sciences.
The unbridled freedom to criticize religion is not been recognized in all States.
Where a religion forms part of the national ideology, it may be shielded from
criticism.17 To publicly challenge the prevailing religious ideology is, in some
States, a crime that may be visited with punishment. While freedom of religion
and freedom of expression is often protected in the constitution, these rights are
sometimes curbed by express or implied laws that protect the State religion.18 In
such cases these rights are usually available to citizens ‘within the limits of the
law’ and ‘subject to public policy or morality.’
While such limitations are permissible per se under the Covenant, the manner of
enforcement of these limitations by some States often leads to the arbitrary
restrictions being placed on the enjoyment of these rights. Indeed these two
rights are sometimes limited not by any specific law, but at the discretion of
police or security officials. Whether a religious opinion or political idea voiced in
public is ‘legal’ may ultimately depend upon the subjective assessments of a
security official acting on his or her interpretation of ‘morality’ or ‘public order’.
Such arbitrary exercise of discretionary powers can and does result in the
punishment of critics of the State religion in circumstances where their conduct
would not attract official attention if it were directed at a different religion. In
some cases States encourage criticism of certain religions but not others. Such
State practices cannot be reconciled with either the letter or spirit of the
Covenant which prohibits such discrimination. Rules of this kind can lead to
oppression of political dissidents, and manipulation of religious rules by state
actors for political purposes.19
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D.

BALANCING COMPETING RIGHTS IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM: THE
STRUGGLE TO CURB RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE WITHOUT DENYING
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, CONSCIENCE AND RELIGION

Since 11 September 2001, there has been much debate over the extend to which
fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual should be curtailed in order to
provide law enforcement and security agencies with the powers they need to
infiltrate and disrupt terrorist cells. The core question is this: ‘how is balance to
be achieved between (a) respect for the right of individuals to go about their daily
lives without interference from the State, and (b) the protection of the community
from attacks by terrorist organizations? Can fundamental norms of a democratic
society be preserved while at the same time taking necessary measures to
guarantee the right to life and security of the person?
The recent control order fiasco in the UK has renewed debate on this issue.20 A
number of British citizens were placed on control orders after being suspected of
involvement in terrorism. They could not be deported as they are British citizens.
They could not be detained as there was not sufficient evidence to charge or hold
them. Lord Carlisle, who was appointed by the UK government to review
terrorism legislation, claimed that there was ‘solid intelligence’ that some of the
escapees may have fled to Iraq to target US and UK soldiers. This raises
questions about whether further erosion of civil liberties is needed to protect the
British public from terror suspects.
Religious violence - particularly suicide bombing - is a new and bewildering
phenomenon for present generations in many secular democracies. It raises a
host of legal questions. Should people be detained for merely espousing
extreme beliefs, such as support for militant groups that engage in religious or
political violence? Is such an approach compatible with the UK’s obligations
under international human rights law? The Britain parliament must now wrestle
with these questions, as they decide whether or not to adopt laws that involve a
clear departure from their obligation under the European Convention on Human
Rights. Alternatively they may declare a State of emergency in order to justify
suspension of certain basic rights. While both options are undesirable and
perhaps unlikely, if the threat level increases such measures will become more
likely.
1.

You cannot please everybody!

20
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It is the sovereign right of States to determine which laws they adopt and which
rights they protect. They are free to determine for themselves how best to
balance competing rights in the context of their specific development and security
concerns. However States parties to the Covenant have given a solemn
undertaking to guarantee all of the rights and freedoms contained in that
instrument. While some of these rights may be suspended during a state of
emergency, freedom of religion is not one of those rights. (See Article 4 of the
Covenant.)
In balancing competing human rights it is not possible to please everybody. This
is evident from decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, as it struggles
to uphold democratic norms and human rights in cases that involve religious
sensitivity.21 The issues are rarely black and white. They are more often a
shade of grey. Great wisdom must be exercised by those entrusted with the
responsibility of balancing competing human rights. The following case study
illustrates these points.
E.
FREEDOM OF RELIGION, DEMOCRACY AND SECULAR POLITY: THE
TURKISH EXPERIENCE
Turkish polity is of importance to the present study. This medium sized nation of
71 million people has managed to harmonize the Islamic beliefs of most of its
citizens with its obligations under the Covenant and the European Convention of
Human Rights. Article 2 of the Constıtutıon of the Republıc of Turkey provides a
platform for striking this balance:
‘The Republic of Turkey is a democratic, secular and social State
governed by the rule of law; bearing in mind the concepts of public peace,
national solidarity and justice; respecting human rights; loyal to the
nationalism of Atatürk, and based on the fundamental tenets set forth in
the Preamble.’
An ignorant tourist could be excused for thinking that Atatürk - the founder of the
Turkish republic, who died in 1938 - still rules Turkey. His portrait is displayed
prominently in many public and private spaces across the country. However
such images do not always have much serious political or even secularist content
and are perhaps more symbols of nationalism than anything else. Most Islamists
have learned to live with them.22 However huge attendance at pro-secularist
rallies in recent months confirms that Atatürk’s legacy is deep rooted, at least
among the urban and middle-class elites that still actively support secularism.
Those attending voiced their concern about the possible erosion of the
21
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separation of religion and State in Turkey. Such a development would offend,
inter alia, Article 4 of the Turkish Constitution. It bars any amendment of the
Constitution. While questionable from a democratic perspective, Article 4 reflects
the sentiments expressed in the preamble:
‘as required by the principle of secularism, there shall be no interference
whatsoever by sacred religious feelings in state affairs and politics.’
Another curious feature of the Turkish legal order is the prohibition on criticism of
‘Turkishness.’23 Such laws are common in autocracies but frowned upon in
democracies. Can this law be reconciled with freedom of speech?
Is it
consistent with the human rights guarantees provided by Turkey in its bid to join
the EU? It remains to be seen whether Turkey will provide a model for
negotiating issues of religious criticism and free speech. Turkey’s practice of
prosecuting those who acknowledge and document the Armenian Genocide
suggest that there is room for improvement.24 Such limitations on freedom of
expression are clearly inconsistent with basic rights guaranteed under the
Covenant, the UDHR and the European Convention on Human Rights.
One of the most interesting cases decided in the European Court of Human
Rights (ECHR) in recent years goes to the very heart of Turkey’s constitutional
order and the debate about how to balance competing rights in a democratic
State. In the Refah Case, the ECHR had to grapple with the following question:
‘can democracy be guaranteed when religious parties that espouse antidemocratic rhetoric contest elections?’ This raises other profound questions.25
The most striking one is:
If the majority of people want to move away from pluralism and democracy
and establish a non-democratic Islamic State, should judges in Brussels
deny them their wish?

1.
Turkey26

Case Study: Refah Partisi (The Welfare Party) and Others v.
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The Refah case is of significance for Muslim States that are exploring democratic
and human rights based approaches to governance. It concerned the banning of
religious parties. At issue was whether the creed of certain Islamist parties
offended the democratic and secular Constitution of Turkey. At the heart of the
matter is the fear that religious parties may win elections and then set about
dismantling democratic institutions. (So called ‘one man, one vote, one time’
elections.)
a.

The Facts

In May 1997, the Principal State Counsel of Turkey applied to the Constitutional
Court of Turkey to have a political party, Refah Partisi (“Refah”) dissolved. It was
argued that the activities of Refah were contrary to principles of secularism that
are entrenched in the Turkish Constitution. Refah had become the largest
political party in the Turkish parliament following elections of 1995 with 158 seats
in the Grand National Assembly. The applicant cited speeches by Refah
politicians calling for the elimination of secularism and for its replacement with
Sharia. The Applicant drew the court’s attention to speeches by Refah party
members who indicated that force may be used to achieve Refah’s objectives.
The Constitutional Court authorized the disbanding of Refah. It stated that
secularism was “the instrument of the transition to democracy” and that “[w]ithin a
secular State religious feelings simply cannot be associated with politics, public
affairs and legislative provisions.” The following year, high-ranking members of
Refah commenced proceedings in the European Court of Human Rights. They
argued that the dissolution of Refah and the suspension of the right of some of
Refah’s members to participate in politics breached: Article 9 of the European
Convention of Human Rights (which protects freedom of thought), Article 10
(which guarantees freedom of expression), and Article 11 (freedom of assembly
and association). They contended that the banning of their party and associated
acts were not necessary to protect Turkish democracy. In particular they
highlighted the fact that Refah had been in power from 1996-1997 and not
attempted to bring about transform Turkey into a theocracy27 or place the country
under Islamic law. Moreover, Refah members had no tried to use force to fulfill
their ideological objectives.
b.

The Decision of the European Court of Human Rights

In a unanimously decision, the European Court of Human Rights opined that
“compromise between the requirements of defending democratic society and
individual rights is inherent in the Convention system.” It declared that the State
“may decide to impose on its serving or future civil servants, who will be required
to wield a portion of its sovereign power, the duty to refrain from taking part in the
Islamic fundamentalist movement.” Moreover, it found that the Applicants had
27
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not presented sufficient evidence that the dissolution of Refah was carried out
other than for the reasons set out in the decision of the Constitutional Court of
Turkey. Furthermore, these reasons (the protection: of secularism; national
security; and public safety) were legitimate under Article 11(2) of the European
Convention of Human Rights. Consequently Turkey was not in violation of
Articles 9, 10 or 11 as these rights “cannot deprive the authorities of a State in
which an association, through its activities, jeopardizes that State’s institutions, of
the right to protect those institutions.”
c.

Analysis

The case is interesting for a range of reasons. Firstly it suggests that religious
parties whose policies are at odds with democratic institutions and secular norms
have no place in the democratic political landscape. Secondly it implies that
enforcement of Sharia is inconsistent with basic rights and freedoms guaranteed
under the European Convention of Human Rights. Nonetheless, where Islamist
parties enjoy popular support they are likely to emerge and re-emerge over time
in Muslim societies. This happened in Turkey. Prime Minister Erdoğan and
Foreign Minister Gül of the current ruling party in Turkey (the AK Party [‘Justice
and Development Party’]), were, at different times, both members of banned
religious parties - Refah and Fazilet Partisi (FP, "the Virtue Party").28 AK
espouses a commitment to democracy and says its policies reflect the diversity
of modern Turkey. It denies any extremist religious agenda. Nonetheless, as
has been noted, the issue triggered mass protests, with both supporters and
opponents of the AK taking to the streets. The former claim that they are
defending Turkey’s secular constitution and that religion should be a private
matter.29
F.

THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS

Almost all States have now given solemn undertakings to protect freedom of
expression, freedom of religion and freedom of assembly. There are now 160
State Parties to the Covenant - including most Muslim countries.30 Afghanistan,
Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, Egypt, Iran, Libya, Kuwait, Djibouti, Indonesia, India,
Bangladesh, Tunisia, Mali, Morocco, Bahrain, Jordan, Syria, Sudan, Chad,
Somalia, Turkey, Cameroon, Thailand and Algeria are all parties to the
Covenant. (Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and UAE are the major Muslim States yet to
accede to the Covenant.)
The Covenant is a descendent of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR), adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1948. It has been repeatedly
reaffirmed ever since by the General Assembly. Its articles are now widely
28
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For both sides of the debate see: ‘Turkey political crisis: Readers' views’ 2 May 2007
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30
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acknowledged as reflecting binding norms of international legal obligation. As
long ago as 1980, the U.S. Court of Appeals stated "several commentators have
concluded that the Universal Declaration has become, in toto, a part of binding
customary international law."31 Given that more than three quarters of the UN’s
members States are now bound by the Covenant under treaty law, it is arguable
that all nations may be bound by this instrument under customary international
law.32
1.
Committee

‘General Comments’ of the United Nations Human Rights

In order to assist States Parties to the Covenant in ensuring that their law and
practice complies with their obligations under the Covenant, the United Nations
Human Rights Committee (‘the Committee’) has issued a series of General
Comments on articles contained in the Covenant. The General Comments on
freedom of religion and freedom of expression are examined here, together with
those relating to implementation of the Covenant by States.
2.

Implementation of the Covenant

General Comment (3)33 deals with implementation of Covenant rights at the
national level. It recognises that States parties have the discretion to choose
their method of implementation - within the framework set out in the relevant
article(s).34 The Committee stresses that ‘implementation does not depend
solely on constitutional or legislative enactments’. They are ‘often not per se
sufficient.’ Moreover ‘States parties have … to ensure the enjoyment of these
rights to all individuals under their jurisdiction.’35 (Not merely their own citizens or
followers of the State religion.)
3.

Freedom of Expression

Article 19 of the Covenant states:
1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.
2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall
include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all
kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form
of art, or through any other media of his choice.
3. The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article
carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be
subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided
by law and are necessary:
31
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32
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34
See Article 2 of the Covenant.
35
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(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others;
(b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre
public), or of public health or morals.
The UN Human Rights Committee has emphasized that the "right to hold
opinions without interference" is a right for which the Covenant permits no
exception or restriction.36 This is significant in context of the debate about
whether free speech extends to the right to criticize the beliefs of others. There
is no requirement under the Covenant that individuals must censure their
opinions on the religious beliefs or ideologies of others. Indeed it is hard to
imagine how freedom of speech could be rationally limited in such a manner
without engaging in the kind of repression that the Covenant seeks to prevent.
Consider the following hypothetical example. ‘Dietism’ is a religion that prohibits
its members from consuming foods that contain certain vitamins that are an
essential part of a healthy diet. Should non-members of the religion be
prohibited from criticizing this tenant of the Dietism faith? How else can followers
of Dietism be warned of the danger that this belief poses to their health?37
The Committee goes on to note that ‘Paragraph 2 (Article 19) requires protection
of the right to freedom of expression, which includes not only freedom to "impart
information and ideas of all kinds", but also freedom to "seek" and "receive" them
"regardless of frontiers" and in whatever medium, "either orally, in writing or in
print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice". Consequently
efforts by States to block public access to satellite TV networks, mobile phone
communication or the internet offend the right to freedom of expression. So do
efforts by State officials to monitor private communications for the purposes of
enforcing oppressive and discriminatory laws.
It also notes that any restrictions on freedom of expression must be "provided by
law" and only imposed for one of the purposes set out in subparagraphs (a) and
(b) of paragraph 3. The restrictions must be "necessary" for that State party for
one of those purposes set out in (a) or (b). If they are not, such laws offend the
Covenant. Blasphemy laws would therefore only be valid if it could be
demonstrated that they were necessary for one of these purposes. The real
legal challenge arises where States have to decide whether certain publications
may incite violence. Where certain parts of the population have previously
responded violently to perceived criticism of their faith there will be a genuine
threat of riots and violence. In the context of Islam we know that certain critical
expressions can be guaranteed to produce violence.38 Should Muslim majority
States therefore not permit any such criticism? A perusal of public libraries in
36

General Comment No. 10: Freedom of expression (Art. 19) 29/06/83. (1983)
After devising this ‘hypothetical’ I was surprised to discover that there is a religious movement (of sorts) in the US
called Dietism.
37
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A recent example is violent protests over Danish cartoons which many Muslims considered an insult to
their religion. More than 100 people died across the world in 2005 and 2006 during this saga. The most
serious incidents occurred in Nigeria, Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq and Pakistan.
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some Muslim States reveals that this is not the universal practice. Any number
of books that could be construed as being critical of Islam can be found in
libraries in some Muslim countries. If they are not banned, then why are highprofile works such as The Satanic Verses banned? Is the degree of adverse
publicity the work has attracted the barometer? Or is there a ‘scale of ridicule’ to
be applied here? If the work has literary merit and is a genuine work of academic
scholarship rather than mere scuttlebutt should it be published? These are
questions for each State to determine. Under the Covenant it would seem that
this assessment must be made on a case by case basis.
4.

Freedom of thought, conscience and religion

Article 18 states:
1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and
religion. This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or
belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with
others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship,
observance, practice and teaching.
2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to
have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice.
3. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs may be subject only to
such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect
public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and
freedoms of others.
4. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect
for the liberty of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to ensure
the religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their
own convictions.
General Comment No. 22 addresses the rights to freedom of thought,
conscience and religion.39 It emphasizes that these rights encompass the
freedom to hold beliefs. This is particularly important in societies where atheism
is the State ideology.
The Committee notes that freedom of thought, conscience and religion is:
far-reaching and profound; it encompasses freedom of thought on all
matters, personal conviction and the commitment to religion or belief,
whether manifested individually or in community with others.

39

ICCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4, General Comment No. 22. : 30/07/93.
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The Committee underscores the fact that ‘the freedom of thought and the
freedom of conscience are protected equally with the freedom of religion and
belief.’ It also notes that:
The fundamental character of these freedoms is also reflected in the fact
that this provision cannot be derogated from, even in time of public
emergency, as stated in article 4.2 of the Covenant.
(i)

The protection against discrimination on the basis of religion

Importantly in the context of this presentation, the Committee notes that:
Article 18 protects theistic, non-theistic and atheistic beliefs, as well as the
right not to profess any religion or belief. The terms "belief" and "religion"
are to be broadly construed. Article 18 is not limited in its application to
traditional religions or to religions and beliefs with institutional
characteristics or practices analogous to those of traditional religions. The
Committee therefore views with concern any tendency to discriminate
against any religion or belief for any reason, including the fact that they
are newly established, or represent religious minorities that may be the
subject of hostility on the part of a predominant religious community.
A review of the annual reports of Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International
and other non-governmental human rights organisations reveals that
discrimination on the basis of religion is alive and well in a number of States. In
some instances such discrimination is carried out by governmental officials at the
behest of the State.40
Attention now turns to two cases studies which tease out some of the issues and
principles discussed above.
Case Study (1): The Jedi Knights – Religion or Popular Culture?
As has been noted, the UN Human Rights Committee has stated that new and
emerging religions are covered by the Covenant. While some emerging religions
and sects are a source of concern (due to their extremist beliefs and advocacy or
practice of violence), others reflect orthodox notions of religion involving worship,
devotion to God and acts of charity. A third variety are emerging religious cults
that are more ‘cultural trends’ or ‘passing fads’ than serious religions. One
example is the recent international campaign for ‘Jedi Knights’ to be recognized
40

I explore this issue further in a forthcoming monograph: Terrorism, Causes and Cures: Legal, Political and
Philosophical Perspectives, T. Brian Mooney, Rob Imre and Ben Clarke. (Ashgate Press, UK. Projected publication
September, 2007.)
42
One example is Manichaeanism, a dualistic religion which emerged in Babylon in the 3rd century CE. It was seen as
a threat Christianity, Zoroastrianism, and later, Islam. Manichaeans were persecuted by followers of three of these
religions. In 382 Roman Emperor Theodosius I issued a decree of death for Manichaeans. See: Runciman, Steven The
Medieval Manichee: A Study of the Christian Dualist Heresy(1982).
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as a religion. It seems that some people have embraced Yoda, Luke Skywalker
and the other Jedi heroes from the Star Wars films as spiritual role models.
Whether disillusioned by religious violence and division, or simply having fun,
hundreds of thousands of people have indicated in national census forms that
they are ‘Jedi Knights’. In Canada, New Zealand, the UK and Australia there
were sizable internet campaigns to have ‘Jedi Knight’ listed as a religion on
national census forms. While widely regarded as a ‘massive practical joke’, the
Australian Bureau of Statistics did not see the humour in this campaign. In 2001
it threatened persons who wrote ‘Jedi Knight’ as their religion with a $1,000 fine
for stating false information on their census form. This threat back fired. It
triggered an avalanche of internet support for ‘the Jedi cause.’ Through sheer
weight of numbers, census officials in these countries had little option but to
include ‘Jedi Knight’ on the census form. Indeed ‘Jedi Knights’ have often far
outnumbered followers of many well recognized minority religions in census
records. In a recent New Zealand census 53,000 people listed themselves as
Jedi. 70,000 Australians did so in their 2001 census, while in the Canadian
census of 2001 some 20,000 people reported their religion as Jedi. However the
global centre of the Jedi faith appears to be England and Wales, where a
staggering 390,000 people recently indicated their allegiance to the Jedi Knights.
What is to be done about the Jedis? Should they be acknowledged, ignored, or
repressed? A glance at history reveals that repression of religious sects often
fuels their growth. One need look no further than Christianity, Islam and the
Baha’i faiths. In each case there have been attempts to repress these religious
movements. All have survived and thrived. Christianity, which was suppressed
in Soviet bloc countries, and in China, is now stronger in those places than it is in
Western European. The same is true of Islam in a number of places where
Muslims have been oppressed. The Bahai’s of Iran face continuing persecution
and discrimination at home, yet their religion continues to thrive, due in large
measure to the growing Persian Diaspora.
Short of wiping out all members of a religion, which has occurred,42 repression
does not work. Nor is it compatible with basic human rights. Whether the Jedi
Knights emerge as a viable religion, or peter out when the next fashion takes
hold, is not the issue. The issue is that in an age of universal human rights,
people are free to believe whatever they like. However their religious practices
must not harm others and their religious speech must not incite violence or
hatred.43
Case Study (2): Monty Python and Adel Imam
Monty Python’s The Life of Brian (1979) is one the most cherished movies in
British film history. It is a comic work of genius. Some British politicians have
suggested that such films may, in the present age, not be able to be made, due
43

For a useful discussion of hate speech see: Steiner, Alston and Goodman, pp 639-650.
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to the restrictive impact of racial and religious hatred laws.44 The Life of Brian is
a satirical comedy set during the time of Jesus. The star of the film is not Jesus
but a fictional character named Brian. The essence of the film is that some local
people mistake Brian for ‘The Messiah.’ Many comic scenes flow from this
premise. In one scene Brian’s mother calls out from the crowd ‘He's not the
Messiah. He's a very naughty boy.’ At another point, The Gospel according to
Matthew is misquoted by those at the back of the crowd, who hear ‘Blessed are
the cheese makers’ rather than ‘Blessed are the peace makers.’ These phrases
have now entered into common usage in the English language. The first phrase
is regarded by some film critics as the best catchphrase in film history. There are
also sexual innuendos and some rude language in the film. If you ask a British
adult about the Life of Brian, many will be able to recite a line or two from the
film. It is like asking an Arab whether they have heard of Adel Imam. You can’t
help but think of the happy chaos that seems to follow Imam through almost
every film he makes. The question is ‘should the Life of Brian be banned
because it takes a satirical look at Biblical times and has risqué content?’45
‘Should al-Irhab wa-l-Kebab (Terrorism and Kebab) (1992) be banned because
of its subtle observations about religion and sex?’ Or more broadly, ‘should Adel
Imam’s films be banned because of his occasional immodest behaviour on film,
his liberal views, or the offence his films may cause to religious conservatives?’ I
doubt that Adel Imam’s films would be banned in Arab States without a huge
public outcry. It would be the same if the Life of Brian were banned in Britain.
Why? In a nutshell, the rights of people to choose what they watch and listen to
are time honoured universal rights. People can choose not to watch films or
music video clips that may offend their religious sensibilities. Their right to make
this choice is at the core of what it means to live in a free and democratic society.
It is also fundamental to the Covenant.
G.

FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND INCITEMENT OF RELIGIOUS HATRED

In 2006 the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 was enacted in the UK. It
created new offences that prohibits conduct which stirs up hatred against
persons on religious grounds. Religious hatred is defined as hatred against a
group of persons defined by reference to religious belief or lack of religious belief.
The legislation states:
A person who uses threatening words or behaviour, or displays any
written material which is threatening, is guilty of an offence if he intends
thereby to stir up religious hatred. (italics added)46
44

See House of Commons Hansard Debates, 11 July 2005, accessible at:
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmhansrd/vo050711/debtext/50711-28.htm
45
The Life of Brian was banned for a number of years in some Western countries - including the Republic of Ireland,
Norway, Italy and parts of the U.S. - for its alleged blasphemous comment. However this merely fuelled publicity and
added to the film’s popularity. It was marketed in Sweden as 'The film that is so funny that it was banned in Norway.'
46
The new offences apply to the use of words or behaviour or display of written material (new section 29B), publishing
or distributing written material (new section 29C), the public performance of a play (new section 29D), distributing,
showing or playing a recording (new section 29E), broadcasting or including a programme in a programme service
(new section 29F) and the possession of written materials or recordings with a view to display, publication, distribution
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Under this law criticism of a certain religion or it prophets would not constitute an
offence per se. Instead it must be proved that such criticisms are made by
means of threatening words or behaviour AND with the intention of stirring up
religious hatred. Such conduct would be punishable.
This legislation is likely to withstand a legal challenge to the European
Convention of Human Rights. Why? In this writer’s opinion the banning of the
conduct specified in the Act is demonstrably necessary in a democratic society,
and therefore would not contravene the Convention right to freedom of opinion
and expression. Threatening words and behaviour uttered with the intent to stir
up religious hatred are incompatible with a pluralistic society. They clearly
undermine the freedom of others to hold their own beliefs free from intimidation.
H.
CRITICISM OF
DISCRIMINATION

RELIGION

AND

THE

PRINCIPLE

OF

NON-

As noted above, the mere criticism of certain beliefs (i.e. without threats or
intimidation) is protected under the freedom of expression. Whether the target of
criticism is a religion, ideology, prophet or political leader, the right to criticize is
guaranteed under the Covenant. If it were otherwise, all manner of political and
religious speech would have to be banned, as the principle of non-discrimination
requires that such bans be applied uniformly. Let us take the example of religion.
To ban criticism of religion per se is to declare that freedom of speech is fettered
in this respect. Public criticism of established religious beliefs and doctrines
would be prohibited. A number of problems arise here. As noted above, any ban
on criticism of religion would need to be applied to all religions due to the
Covenant requirement of non-discrimination. Now let’s imagine trying to apply
this ban in practice. Intractable problems would arise. Consider the following
questions: What is to be done about sacred texts that are critical of other
religions or religious groups? Should they no longer be publicly recited or taught
in religious schools? Where is the line to be drawn between religion, philosophy
and ideology? Should there be a minimum number of followers for a religion to
be recognized? Would all sects be covered - including those that are more
cultural associations than religions? When does a religion cease to be such?
What about ‘dead’ religions such as the worship of Ba’al?47 (Should it be
acceptable to criticize ‘dead’ religions as opposed to ‘living’ ones?) Who would
answer these questions? The UN Human Rights Council? Or individual States
party to the Covenant?
These questions highlight an important fact. In an age of pluralism and Covenant
values, the notion of protected religious knowledge (i.e. religious concepts and
beliefs which, according to a religion, are not open to criticism) becomes all but
impossible to enforce without offending: (a) the principle of non-discrimination,
or inclusion in a programme service (new section 29G). For each offence the words, behaviour, written material,
recordings or programmes must be threatening and intended to stir up religious hatred.
47

2 Kings 10: 26-28
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and (b) the rights to freedom of expression, conscience and religion.
remainder of this article explores this issue in greater depth...
I.

The

THE PROBLEM OF DIRECT CRITICISM OF ISLAM

One of the most sensitive issues concerning freedom of speech is direct criticism
of the pillars of the Islamic faith. Few contemporary writers are willing to do so
unless these use a pseudonym.48 A rare exception is Ayaan Hirsi Ali. Born in
Somalia, and raised as a devout Muslim, Ali stopped practicing Islam for a range
of reasons outlined in her book, and eventually became an atheist. In 2004,
together with Dutch filmmaker Theo Van Gogh, she made a 10 minute film called
Submission Part I. It was greeted instant condemnation (for its criticism of Islam)
and praise (for highlighting the problem of domestic violence and marginalization
of women).49 The film depicts a Muslim woman in prayer who tells God that she
may not be able to submit any longer. The woman narrates a story of domestic
violence and pregnancy as a result of being raped by an uncle. She is seminaked and has verses of Koran written on her body. In making such a
provocative film, Ali alienated her Muslim audience and missed an opportunity to
make a powerful statement about domestic violence and the cultures from which
it springs. Instead the film degenerates into an exercise in ridicule of the Islamic
faith itself. This approach was counter-productive and unnecessary. If a ‘scale
of ridicule’ were applied, (as mooted on page 19 above) this film would score
near, or at, the top end of the scale.
While extremely provocative and offensive to many Muslims, Submission Part I
does not breach the Covenant. This is clear from the General Comment
discussed above. It is therefore a legitimate, albeit distasteful, exercise of
freedom of conscience and expression. The fact that many Muslims would
disagree with this analysis highlights the difficulties inherent in harmonizing some
aspects of international human rights law and Islamic law. Nonetheless, Muslim
States retain the right to prohibit the showing of the film in the exercise of their
sovereignty. The effectiveness of such a ban is questionable in an era of global
technology. The film is freely available on internet websites including ‘U Tube’, a
site that receives well over 2 million ‘hits’ per month. After the director of the film
was murdered, Ali went into hiding and eventually moved to the US. Her
autobiography, Infidel: My Journey to Enlightenment (2007), made the New York
Times bestsellers list. It was also the number one selling book in Europe for a
time.50

48

Ibn Warraq is arguably the most prominent academic critic of Islam. This US based ex-Muslim writer, born to
Indian-Muslim parents, is known only by his pen-name. His books include: Why I am Not a Muslim (1996); Leaving
Islam: Apostates Speak Out, (ed.) (2003); and Which Koran?: Variants, Manuscripts, and the Influence of Pre-Islamic
Poetry (2007).
49
Van Gogh was murdered by Dutch citizen Mohammed Bouyeri two months after the film was aired on Dutch TV.
50
For a critique of Islam from a liberal feminist Muslim see: Irshad Manji The Trouble with Islam Today: A
Muslim’s Call for Reform in Her Faith (2004).
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1.
Narrative

Criticism of Religion as permissible Freedom of Speech: A Secular

For proponents of secularism, these controversies are an attempt to repress or
discourage the free flow of ideas and opinions, and are inconsistent with freedom
of conscience and expression.
Efforts to suppress religious or political
expression are also counter-productive, as they frequently draw attention to the
issue that the authorities are seeking to suppress. In a global age, repression of
ideas and opinions is increasingly ineffective. Book and effigy burning, and calls
for punishment or death of those deemed to have offended a religion attract
widespread international media coverage. So does the murder of critics of
religion. Such occurrences have led many people to regard certain religious
communities as intolerant. Insensitive criticism of sensitive religious beliefs, and
violent responses to such criticism, are both unfortunate. They undermine efforts
to promote religious tolerance, inter-faith unity, peace and moderation.
Most religious violence to ‘defend religion’ is not authorized by States, although it
is sometimes tolerated or condoned by State officials. Self-authorized religious
violence is not only anti-democratic and contrary to fundamental human rights
guaranteed under the Covenant, it also damages the reputation of the religion
being ‘defended’ and may distort its public image. Violence against opponents of
a religion breeds secular ‘martyrs’ (Van Gogh), while the threat of violence
breeds secular ‘heroes’ (Ayaan Hirsi Ali). This is no more evident that in the
case of Ayaan Hirsi Ali, who like Salman Rushdie, has been flooded with awards
from States, NGOs and political parties across Europe since being targeted by
radical Islamists. Rather than recant her views, Ali is now writing a new book presumably in the company of her bodyguards. This work of fiction follows the
Prophet Mohammed around the New York Library, where he peruses the shelves
and embarks on a journey of knowledge and enlightenment.51
2.

Criticism of Islam as punishable conduct: An Islamist Narrative

The question ’what is an appropriate response to criticism of Islam’, is, from an
Islamic perspective, a multilayered one. A range of issues must be addressed:
How is the Quran and Hadith to be interpreted? Which school of Islamic
jurisprudence, if any, applies? Is the enforcement of Shariah obligatory? Are
individuals entitled to directly enforce Shariah, or must the matter be left to legal
authorities? Must the religion be physically ‘defended’ by religious authorities, or
can judgment be left to God?

51

For contrasting views on Islam and enlightenment see: Abdelwahab Meddeb, ‘Islam and the Enlightenment: Between
Ebb and Flow’ (2006) 5 Logos journal of modern society & culture, accessible at www.logosjournal.com; Mohammed
Arkoun, The Unthought in Contemporary Islamic Thought, (2002); Mohammed Arkoun, Islam: To Reform or to
Subvert (2006) Dr. Abdulaziz Othman Altwaijri, Enlightenment as an Islamic concept (2007) accessible at
www.isesco.org.ma/pub/Eng/enligth/Chap6.htm (The European concept of enlightenment ‘does not belong to our
Islamic culture and civilization.’)
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Basic concepts of Islamic law that will be relevant including notions of defamation
in Islam, including sabb allah (reviling God) and sabb al-rasul (reviling the
prophet/blasphemy). Others such as irtadda (to renounce Islam) may also be
relevant. For some Muslims living in secular societies, criticism of Islam is
regarded as irresponsible free speech that deserves verbal condemnation but
nothing more. For others, such as Mohammed Bouyeri (Van Gogh’s assassin)
an attack upon the faith is a personal attack which requires immediate
punishment.52 The public showing of Submission Part I would be likely to attract
the attention of prosecutorial authorities in some Muslim States but not others,
reflecting differences in law and tradition. Adding to this diverse array of factors
are the treaty obligations of States. Importantly, no Muslim State entered a
reservation with respect to the right to freedom of expression, conscience and
belief when ratifying the Covenant. For this reason, punishment of apostasy,
heresy, or defamation of religion are inconsistent with their obligations under the
Covenant.53 Indeed conservative Muslims scholars who regard punishment of
apostasy as a religious obligation are under increasing pressure to review their
position in light of the Covenant.54 While opinion among Muslim scholars’
remains divided on this issue55 a growing number of influential Muslim thinkers
are embracing freedom of faith and rejecting the doctrine of earthly punishment
of apostasy.56 In this writer’s view, Muslim States can take much of the heat out
of this debate by simply ratifying the 2nd Protocol to the Covenant (which bans
the death penalty), and implementing this instrument at the national level. If this
approach is adopted, then in the event of antimony between Shariah and human
rights obligations under 2nd Protocol, the latter will prevail. This conclusion flows
from, inter alia, the Law of Treaties,57 and principles of State responsibility.58
3.

Responding to Criticism of Islam

How, from a human rights perspective, should Muslims respond (if at all) to
criticism of their faith? The first thing to recognize is the direct conflict between
the strict application of Shariah punishment and international human rights
standards. Shariah punishment of ridda (repudiation of protected knowledge of
52

Mohammed Bouyeri 'Jihad Manifesto' -A call to destroy America and all "unbelievers" (November 5, 2004)
<http://www.militantislammonitor.org/article/id/312>
53

See comments by Judge Higgens of the International Court of Justice: Rosalyn Higgins, Problems &
Process, International Law and How We Use It (1994), 98.
54
See Abdullah Saeed and Hassan Saeed, (2004) Freedom of Religion, Apostasy and Islam (Burlington,
Vt.: Ashgate).
55
Abdullah Saeed and Hassan Saeed, (2004) Freedom of Religion, Apostasy and Islam (Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate) 14;
See also M. J. Bossuyt, Guide to the ‘Travaux Pre´paratoires’ of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, (1987); K. J. Partsch, ‘Freedom of Conscience and Expression, and Political Freedoms’, in L. Henkin (ed.), The
International Bill of Rights The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; Sultan Tabandeh, A Muslim Commentary on
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1970), 70.
56
See Saeed and Saeed, ibid. See also Dr. Mohammad Omar Farooq ‘On Apostasy and Islam: 100+ Notable Islamic
Voices affirming the Freedom of Faith’ April 2, 2007 <http://apostasyandislam.blogspot.com/> accessed 20 June 2007.
57

See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), Articles 26 & 27.
See Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Report of the ILC on
the Work of its Fifty-third Session, UN GAOR, 56th Sess, Supp No 10, p 43, UN Doc A/56/10 (2001),
Articles 1 & 2.
58
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Islam), whether committed by murtaddun (apostates) or not, cannot be
reconciled with the UDHR or the Covenant. Consequently a violent response to
criticism of Islam violates international human rights law. This is so irrespective
of whether the violence is judicially sanctioned or extra-judicial in character. It is
also unnecessary under Islamic law, according to a growing number of
scholars.59 All States party to the Covenant have a treaty obligation to suppress
violence against those who exercise freedom of speech. They are required to
reign in those who issue fatwas calling for the death of critics of Islam. This is
easier said than done in States where criticism of Islam is regarded by the
majority of the population as a criminal act that must be punished. In promoting
change in thinking on this issue a number of strategies can be adopted. One is
to highlight the longstanding view of Arab and Muslim States and organizations
that violence is not the answer to social problems. Here the universal values of
tolerance, mercy and peace can be emphasized together with UN principles on
peaceful dispute resolution. Another approach is to note that criticism of religion
can be viewed as an opportunity to correct misunderstandings. In the Islamic
context, there are some famous cases where such dialogues have resulted in
da’wah (invitation) and even al-ikrah (conversion without coercion or
manipulation) of former critics of Islam or particular Islamic sects. Of course
under the Covenant, freedom of religion includes freedom to proselytize.60
However this cuts both ways. In other words, if the principle of nondiscrimination is to be honoured, then the right to proselytize must be universally
respected, and therefore be available to all religious groups in all States that are
party to the Covenant.
This approach raises difficulties in States where Sharia is followed. The concept
of ikhtilaf 61 renders the central tenants of Islam ‘protected knowledge’, which are
off limits for criticism. An alternative approach is to say that as Islam encourages
the quest for knowledge, Muslims should engage in reasoned debate on any
subject.62 Moreover, as much of the criticism of Islam is a product of ignorance
of the contemporary practices of the majority Muslims throughout the world,
debate offers a chance to dispel misunderstandings and impart knowledge. The
importance of such discussion is widely held by western Muslims, perhaps out of
necessity. They are living in societies where people are free to question
everything – including religious beliefs and practices. Since 911 there is
unprecedented public interest in Islam. Whether it be the hijab, jihad, radical
59

See for example: Abdullahi Ahmed An –Na’im, ‘Human Rights in the Muslim World’ (1990) 3 Harvard
Human Rights Journal 13, cited in Steiner, Alston and Goodman, 531-539, at 537-538.
60

See generally: Human Rights Committee, General Comment 22, Article 18 (Forty-eighth session, 1993). Compilation
of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc.
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 at 35 (1994).
61
See Ali Khan, ‘Islam as Intellectual Property’ (2000-2001) 31 Cumb Law Review 631, at 642. (‘Ikhtilaf or
disagreement is prohibited when the text of the Quran is clear.’)
62
M. A. Muqtedar Khan contends that:
Muslims must go back and read Ibn Rushd (Fasl al-Maqaal, The Decisive Treatise), and learn how he
bridged science and religion, in order to understand that Islam has nothing to fear from reason and so to open
their hearts and minds to rational thought. This is the goal that Ibn Khaldun, the great 14th century Arab
historian and philosopher, would have called the "engine of civilization." M. A. Muqtedar Khan “Two
Theories of Ijtihad” The Washington Times [03.22.06]
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Islam, Islamist terror organisations such as Al Qaeda, or the meaning of Islamic
verses invoked by jihadists, Muslims living in the West can expect to be asked
about these things in the work place, on the bus, at in other daily interactions with
non-Muslims. For many western Muslims, discussion and debate about even the
most sensitive of religious issues has become part of their ordinary lives.
4.

Reasoned Debated as a Path to Knowledge, Understanding and
Peaceful Resolution of Antimony

In concluding, we return to the question posed at the outset: Does freedom of
speech include the right to publicly ridicule the religious beliefs of others? For
States parties to the Covenant, the question must be answered in the affirmative.
While nations retain the sovereign right to prohibit whatever conduct they please,
laws which arbitrarily curb basic human rights (e.g. by banning criticism of the
State religion but not others) breach the Covenant, unless it can be
demonstrated that there are valid public order reasons for a specific law.
Moreover discriminatory laws of this kind, particularly those which provide for
harsh punishment of literary criticism of religion, will continue to generate
adverse international media attention. Furthermore, it is arguable that the
international community has an obligation erga omnes to protect people against
such punishment, because fundamental human rights have been recognized by
some legal scholars as jus cogens.63
Should freedom of speech include the right to ridicule the religious beliefs of
others? This question may be answered from numerous perspectives. A moral
argument may be made that such behaviour is provocative, insensitive, rude and
‘uncivilized’. On the other hand, it can be beneficial. The exposure of charlatans
and extremists, who use religion to exploit others, or pursue destructive goals, is
in the public interest. Criticism of their religious beliefs and practices may be an
essential part of this process. However the distinction between responsible
refutation and irresponsible ridicule may be a fine one. Another dimension to the
topic is refutation of religious doctrines through scientific advances. In some
cases, this may be the inevitable outcome of scientific research, inquiry and
debate, which may render certain religious ideas untenable.
In this writer’s view, opportunities for rational and reasoned debate among
people of different religious backgrounds, or none at all, need to be grasped.
They offer a path to knowledge, understanding of each other, mutual respect,
education and exposure to new ideas. Such debate can pave the way towards
greater respect for the freedoms of expression and religion, and a greater
willingness by all sides to exercise them in a responsible manner. At this
juncture, it is interesting to note that Shi'ite cleric Seyyed Hossein Khomeini, the
63

See The Responsibility to Protect (Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty) December
2001 Http://Www.Iciss.Ca/Report2-En.Asp
General Assembly World Summit Outcome Document (2005) paragraphs 138 and 139 www.un.org/summit2005/documents.html
Security Council Resolution 1674 (2006), paragraph 8
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grandson of Ayatollah Khomeini, has recently stated that he is open to the idea of
meeting Salman Rushdie, and believed that he might benefit from Rushdie’s
knowledge about religion, particularly Indian religions. He also claimed that he
would never have issued a fatwa calling for the dead of Salman Rushdie.65 In his
view, decision-making authority involving death in apostasy cases was only
accorded to the prophets of Islam - not to ordinary people.
J.

CONCLUSION

In the 21st century, many people from diverse cultures, religions and nationalities
live side by side in pluralistic societies. This growing trend is shaped by a range
of factors including globalization. In this environment, there is a growing
awareness of the importance of respect for the religious sensibilities of others. At
the same time, radical Islamist ideologies and associated religious violence by
extremists, has emerged as a serious security concern for many States –
including western liberal democracies. Islam is therefore at the centre of public
debate about the limits of basic freedoms, including the freedom to criticize
religion. Anger at Islamist violence has sparked unprecedented public criticism
of Islam. Such criticism has, on occasion, sparked significant protest and
occasional violence from some Muslims. This in turn has fortified the resolve of
some defenders of free speech to exercise this right - even where it is likely to
trigger religious violence. In this environment, the limits of freedom of speech are
likely to remain a matter of controversy. So too is the question of permissible
responses to criticism of sacred beliefs.
Yet if current trends in globalization and pluralism continue, radical Islamist
ideologies are likely to recede over time. If so, the earthly punishment of both
apostasy and defamation of Islam may recede with it. .Some Muslim States have
already scraped apostasy and religious defamation laws, while a number of
others have simply ceased to enforce them.66 These patterns are unsurprising most States are now multi-faith societies. In such societies some people will
inevitably marry outside their faith tradition and/or change religion. In both cases,
their right to do so is protected under international human rights law. Religious
extremists are trying to halt the spread of such norms in a number of States.
Some are willing to engage in terrorism in order to promote their religio-political
ideology. However such methods are not supported by the majority of the
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‘Ayatollah Khomeini's Grandson tells VOA Rushdie Fatwa was Wrong’ Interview Voice of America 27 April 2004,
Washington, D.C. available at: http://www.payvand.com/news/04/apr/1198.html Note: In 1998 the Iranian

government distanced itself from the fatwa by formally guaranteeing that it would not attempt to enforce it.
However it declared itself unable to withdraw the edict, which many others have declared should be carried
out.

66

See Saeed & Saeed, pp9-19
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Muslims.67 Moreover, Muslim leaders across the world have repeatedly urged
moderation, and emphasised Islamic principles of mercy, love, tolerance, and
peace68 in the resolution of disputes. In Muslim countries where basic civil and
political rights are not yet fully protected, these Islamic principles should define
the response to criticisms of Islam. However all States Parties to the Covenant
are obliged to guarantee freedoms of expression, conscience and religion within
their territory, and to implement the Covenant. Consequently, the peaceful
exercise of these rights should never be visited with punishment - even when the
exercise of these basic rights offends local norms - whether they be religious,
tribal or ideological in origin.
Annexure I: States Party to the Covenant (ICCPR) at 19 April 2007

Afghanistan

.

24 Jan 1983 a

Albania

.

4 Oct 1991 a

Algeria

10 Dec 1968

12 Sep 1989

Andorra

5 Aug 2002

22 Sep 2006

Angola

.

10 Jan 1992 a

Argentina

19 Feb 1968

8 Aug 1986

Armenia

.

23 Jun 1993 a

Australia

18 Dec 1972

13 Aug 1980

Austria

10 Dec 1973

10 Sep 1978

Azerbaijan

.

13 Aug 1992 a

Bahrain

.

20 Sep 2006 a

Bangladesh

.

6 Sep 2000 a

Barbados

.

5 Jan 1973 a

Belarus

19 Mar 1968

12 Nov 1973

Belgium

10 Dec 1968

21 Apr 1983

Belize

.

10 Jun 1996 a

Benin

.

12 Mar 1992 a

Bolivia

.

12 Aug 1982 a

67

See for example: ‘A Rising Tide Lifts Mood in the Developing World: Support for Suicide Bombing
Drops Sharply in Muslim Countries’, 47-Nation Pew Global Attitudes Survey, 24 July 2007 Available at:
www.pewresearch.org accessed 9 October 2007.
68
See for example The Amman Message, and the ‘Grand list of endorsements of the Amman Message’ Both
are available at www.ammanmessage.com
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Bosnia and Herzegovina

.

1 Sep 1993 d

Botswana

8 Sep 2000

8 Sep 2000

Brazil

.

24 Jan 1992 a

Bulgaria

8 Oct 1968

21 Sep 1970

Burkina Faso

.

4 Jan 1999 a

Burundi

.

9 May 1990 a

Cambodia

17 Oct 1980

26 May 1992 a

Cameroon

.

27 Jun 1984 a

Canada

.

19 May 1976 a

Cape Verde

.

6 Aug 1993 a

Central African Republic

.

8 May 1981 a

Chad

.

9 Jun 1995 a

Chile

16 Sep 1969

10 Feb 1972

China

5 Oct 1998

.

Colombia

21 Dec 1966

29 Oct 1969

Congo

.

5 Oct 1983 a

Costa Rica

19 Dec 1966

29 Nov 1968

Côte d'Ivoire

.

26 Mar 1992 a

Croatia

.

12 Oct 1992 d

Cyprus

19 Dec 1966

2 Apr 1969

Czech Republic

.

22 Feb 1993 d

Democratic People's Republic of Korea

.

14 Sep 1981 a

Democratic Republic of the Congo

.

1 Nov 1976 a

Denmark

20 Mar 1968

6 Jan 1972

Djibouti

.

5 Nov 2002 a

Dominica

.

17 Jun 1993 a

Dominican Republic

.

4 Jan 1978 a

Ecuador

4 Apr 1968

6 Mar 1969

Egypt

4 Aug 1967

14 Jan 1982

El Salvador

21 Sep 1967

30 Nov 1979

Equatorial Guinea

.

25 Sep 1987 a
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Eritrea

.

22 Jan 2002 a

Estonia

.

21 Oct 1991 a

Ethiopia

.

11 Jun 1993 a

Finland

11 Oct 1967

19 Aug 1975

France

.

4 Nov 1980 a

Gabon

.

21 Jan 1983 a

Gambia

.

22 Mar 1979 a

Georgia

.

3 May 1994 a

Germany

9 Oct 1968

17 Dec 1973

Ghana

7 Sep 2000

7 Sep 2000

Greece

.

5 May 1997 a

Grenada

.

6 Sep 1991 a

Guatemala

.

5 May 1992 a

Guinea

28 Feb 1967

24 Jan 1978

Guinea-Bissau

12 Sep 2000

.

Guyana

22 Aug 1968

15 Feb 1977

Haiti

.

6 Feb 1991 a

Honduras

19 Dec 1966

25 Aug 1997

Hungary

25 Mar 1969

17 Jan 1974

Iceland

30 Dec 1968

22 Aug 1979

India

.

10 Apr 1979 a

Indonesia

.

23 Feb 2006 a

Iran (Islamic Republic of)

4 Apr 1968

24 Jun 1975

Iraq

18 Feb 1969

25 Jan 1971

Ireland

1 Oct 1973

8 Dec 1989

Israel

19 Dec 1966

3 Oct 1991

Italy

18 Jan 1967

15 Sep 1978

Jamaica

19 Dec 1966

3 Oct 1975

Japan

30 May 1978

21 Jun 1979

Jordan

30 Jun 1972

28 May 1975

Kazakhstan

2 Dec 2003

24 Jan 2006
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Kenya

.

1 May 1972 a

Kuwait

.

21 May 1996 a

Kyrgyzstan

.

7 Oct 1994 a

Lao People's Democratic Republic

7 Dec 2000

.

Latvia

.

14 Apr 1992 a

Lebanon

.

3 Nov 1972 a

Lesotho

.

9 Sep 1992 a

Liberia

18 Apr 1967

22 Sep 2004

Libyan Arab Jamahiriya

.

15 May 1970 a

Liechtenstein

.

10 Dec 1998 a

Lithuania

.

20 Nov 1991 a

Luxembourg

26 Nov 1974

18 Aug 1983

Madagascar

17 Sep 1969

21 Jun 1971

Malawi

.

22 Dec 1993 a

Maldives

.

19 Sep 2006 a

Mali

.

16 Jul 1974 a

Malta

.

13 Sep 1990 a

Mauritania

.

17 Nov 2004 a

Mauritius

.

12 Dec 1973 a

Mexico

.

23 Mar 1981 a

Monaco

26 Jun 1997

28 Aug 1997

Mongolia

5 Jun 1968

18 Nov 1974

Montenegro

.

23 Oct 2006 d

Morocco

19 Jan 1977

3 May 1979

Mozambique

.

21 Jul 1993 a

Namibia

.

28 Nov 1994 a

Nauru

12 Nov 2001

.

Nepal

.

14 May 1991 a

Netherlands

25 Jun 1969

11 Dec 1978

New Zealand

12 Nov 1968

28 Dec 1978

Nicaragua

.

12 Mar 1980 a
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Niger

.

7 Mar 1986 a

Nigeria

.

29 Jul 1993 a

Norway

20 Mar 1968

13 Sep 1972

Panama

27 Jul 1976

8 Mar 1977

Paraguay

.

10 Jun 1992 a

Peru

11 Aug 1977

28 Apr 1978

Philippines

19 Dec 1966

23 Oct 1986

Poland

2 Mar 1967

18 Mar 1977

Portugal

7 Oct 1976

15 Jun 1978

Republic of Korea

.

10 Apr 1990 a

Republic of Moldova

.

26 Jan 1993 a

Romania

27 Jun 1968

9 Dec 1974

Russian Federation

18 Mar 1968

16 Oct 1973

Rwanda

.

16 Apr 1975 a

Saint Vincent and the Grenadines

.

9 Nov 1981 a

San Marino

.

18 Oct 1985 a

Sao Tome and Principe

31 Oct 1995

.

Senegal

6 Jul 1970

13 Feb 1978

Serbia and Montenegro

.

12 Mar 2001 d

Seychelles

.

5 May 1992 a

Sierra Leone

.

23 Aug 1996 a

Slovakia

.

28 May 1993 d

Slovenia

.

6 Jul 1992 d

Somalia

.

24 Jan 1990 a

South Africa

3 Oct 1994

10 Dec 1998

Spain

28 Sep 1976

27 Apr 1977

Sri Lanka

.

11 Jun 1980 a

Sudan

.

18 Mar 1986 a

Suriname

.

28 Dec 1976 a

Swaziland

.

26 Mar 2004 a

Sweden

29 Sep 1967

6 Dec 1971
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Switzerland

.

18 Jun 1992 a

Syrian Arab Republic

.

21 Apr 1969 a

Tajikistan

.

4 Jan 1999 a

Thailand

.

29 Oct 1996 a

The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

.

18 Jan 1994 d

Timor-Leste

.

18 Sep 2003 a

Togo

.

24 May 1984 a

Trinidad and Tobago

.

21 Dec 1978 a

Tunisia

30 Apr 1968

18 Mar 1969

Turkey

15 Aug 2000

23 Sep 2003

Turkmenistan

.

1 May 1997 a

Uganda

.

21 Jun 1995 a

Ukraine

20 Mar 1968

12 Nov 1973

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

16 Sep 1968

20 May 1976

United Republic of Tanzania

.

11 Jun 1976 a

United States of America

5 Oct 1977

8 Jun 1992

Uruguay

21 Feb 1967

1 Apr 1970

Uzbekistan

.

28 Sep 1995 a

Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)

24 Jun 1969

10 May 1978

Viet Nam

.

24 Sep 1982 a

Yemen

.

9 Feb 1987 a

Zambia

.

10 Apr 1984 a

Zimbabwe

.

13 May 1991 a

Source: Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
<http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm> accessed 1 June 2007.
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